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Kant's categories. I refer to a prevalent, if not indeed, as I believe, a universal inaccuracy in the use of the terms "positive" and "negative." Nothing is perhaps better established in the common idea, even with those most versed in critical discriminations, than that these two terms, positive and negative, are legitimately antithetical to each other, while yet this is not the case. The term truly antithetical to "negation" or "negative" is "affirmation" or "affirmative." "Affirmative" and "negative" make therefore the true coupling of terms in this sense. The true antithet of "positive" is, on the contrary, "dubitative" or "doubtful." A negative proposition is just as positive as an affirmative one. We deny as positively as we affirm; and that which is unpositive or non-positive is simply undecided or doubtful.

There remains much to be said, in this connection, of the relation of the objective case to Objectivity, of the dative case to Teleology, etc. But, to avoid making this communication too long, I omit these additional considerations—saying merely, in general terms, that Grammar repeats Logic throughout in a sense which has not heretofore been clearly expounded, or, so far as I am aware of, even intimated.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS.

As a continuation of the discussion of Trendelenburg's critique of Hegel, Professor Vera of the University of Naples sends us the *Avant-propos de la deuxième édition* of his French translation of Hegel's Logic now printing in Paris. The following extract he thinks will clear up some points controverted by Professor Morris in our January number.

Criticism on Trendelenburg.

Translated from the French of A. VERA, by ANNA C. BRACKETT.

I will speak here of Trendelenburg's *Logical Investigations*; and I speak only of *his* work, because the other works on this subject—such, for example, as that of J. S. Mill—seem to me to possess no serious or scientific importance.* I have already examined this work of Trendelenburg

* What is Mr. Mill's Logic? Is it formal Logic, or is it rather objective Logic? What name shall be given to it? Is it deserving of the name of Logic? I maintain

in the Preface to the second edition of my *Introduction to the Philosophy of Hegel* [p. 26 of vol. vii. J. S. Ph.], where I think that I have demonstrated that it is—I will not say an imitation and a reproduction, but a falsification of Hegel's Logic. I propose here to complete this demonstration.

Those who are not strangers to the works of German philosophy well know that Trendelenburg, after having adopted the meaning and the objective and absolute form of the Logic of Hegel, took the liberty of substituting for the first Hegelian triad (I mean the first in the order of abstraction), i.e. *Being, Non-Being, and Becoming*, another triad, *Being, Thought, and Movement*. In examining this triad, the first question which naturally arises in our minds is this: "What has become of Non-Being in this dialectic, and how have Thought and Movement and then all the rest arisen without Non-Being? For it is plain that, in order to make any progress, Non-Being is quite as necessary as Being, and indeed even more necessary. But the reader can take courage. Non-Being is not lost, and it will appear at the proper time and place. However, it will not appear by the front door, but by a side door and in a kind of disguise.

After having, in the first part of his *Investigations*, given a certain number of categories, Trendelenburg seems to have discovered that all these categories could not have been developed without the intervention of a certain other category. And what is this? Listen to our author:—"We have shown," he says,† "in what precedes, the fundamental active notions (categories).‡ But with these categories there was implicitly (*stillschweigend*) bound up another category which we ought to consider as co-operative (*in dieser Mitwirkung*). This category is Negation (*Verneinung*)."

Thus Negation is placed here as an auxiliary of other categories. And what has it done? It has been active, but only implicitly. Are we in the sphere of Logic or in imaginary spaces? We must say that this implicit or silent work of the category under consideration is not its work, but a work which exists alone in the imagination of the author. For behold how, in the author's imagination, the work would be done. "While," he says, "Movement was producing definite formations (*Gebilde*), at first figures (*Figuren*) and numbers, there appeared in this work (*in dieser That*) a negative moment. There can be no figure unless there is a point of rest (*Hemmung*) in the generating movement. The unities of different numbers are posited as distinguishing them from each other. Each of them is

that the only reply possible to these questions is that it is a confused, undigested, and superficial collection from all the spheres of knowledge; which is only saying that it is the exact opposite of Logic, and the exact opposite of what it should be.

† *Negation*.—The chapter entitled "Negation" is placed in the two great classes of categories designated by Trendelenburg by the names *Real* and *Modal*, and he gives us in these categories only the following remark as to the notion of *Negation*:—"We have already spoken of the fundamental active categories. With these categories there was implicitly bound up a notion which we ought to consider. This notion is *Negation*." Truly this is a very unceremonious way of disposing of it. But such bravado we know is often put on to conceal desperate situations.

‡ They are logically active in the sense that, according to our author, they are developed from the category of Movement.

the work of an activity which at the same time collects and separates them (*einer zusammenfassenden und zugleich ausschliessenden Thätigkeit*). When determinate results come forth from general movement, and when categories spring from this action and from these results, determination appears as a limitation and limitation as a negation. Each determination in itself implies the negation of that which is not itself. Thus negation acts like an element of the thing; not like an original (*ursprüngliches*) element, but like a consequence; not as an end, but as a means; it acts in a positive term, but not as an independent element (*ein selbständiges für sich*)."

Thus speaks Trendelenburg; and we reply that the more he says, the more he condemns his own theory. To begin with: Could there be anything more strange than for one to say to us, "Behold a category without which nothing would have resulted from Movement, but which, although Movement by its aid brought forth other categories, such as Number and its unities, kept itself aloof and worked only in secret"? We ask again whether there was ever made a stranger statement than this. It requires no great effort to see that into the development of the categories this category directly enters; that it works in quite as plain and active a manner as Movement itself, and asserts itself quite as loudly, nay, even more loudly, since without it we should have only an indeterminate Movement, even if we had any Movement at all. But why does Trendelenburg introduce this category here in so arbitrary and singular a manner, and why, at the same time that he assures us that it appears here, is he nevertheless obliged to make it interpose in advance, although he makes it interpose in dumb show? It is because this category is neither more nor less than *Non-Being*.

But notice the skill of the author: We know that Trendelenburg does not wish to have any *Non-Being*. He desires neither the name nor the thing. And it is precisely for this reason that he calls by the name of Negation what in reality is nothing else than *Non-Being*. But why will he not have *Non-Being*? Because if he had admitted *Non-Being* he would have been obliged to place it side by side with Being, and thus all the scaffolding for his logic would have been demolished. But since truth is stronger than skill, he has been obliged to have recourse to the negative element—to an element which in its highest abstraction is exactly *Non-Being*. Trendelenburg then brings in *Non-Being*; but instead of calling it *Non-Being* he calls it Negation; instead of putting it in its proper place as the opposite of Being, he makes it enter—one cannot imagine why—at the end of a series of categories which presuppose it, and which could have had no existence without its co-operation. After this, of what consequence is the silent and passive work which Trendelenburg attributes to Negation, and which should commence in the train of Movement, for the reason, he says, that Movement must have certain points of rest in order that it may be determined? To begin with, it is not correct to say that Negation comes in in the train of Movement either silently or loudly. Movement itself is Movement only because it is neither Being nor Thought (the other two terms of Trendelenburg's triad), and this means that Movement presupposes *Non-Being*. And not alone Movement, but Thought itself, presupposes *Non-Being*, in that it is Thought only because it is that which Being is not.

And now how can any one say that this Non-Being, without which neither Movement nor Thought would have any existence, and by whose aid they are determined, is a passive element, and that it is not an original element? Doubtlessly Non-Being is a passive and derived element, in comparison with higher determinations like Matter, just as Matter is passive in comparison with the more concrete spheres of Nature. This is an elementary point. But Non-Being—or, if it must be so called, Negation—is not passive and derived in the sense in which the followers of Trendelenburg must understand it, i.e. in the sense that Non-Being is less active, less essential, and less original, than Being. Being and Non-Being are equally active and equally passive. They are equally passive in that abstract and indeterminate Being; or Being-in-itself is worth no more than Non-Being; equally abstract and indeterminate as Non-Being by itself. They are equally active in that they both enter on equal terms into the constitution and development of more concrete terms, such as Movement or Thought. Movement is not Movement through Being and because it contains Being, but also through Non-Being and because Non-Being negates Being, and in negating Being makes Movement possible. In other words, Movement *is*, and is Movement quite as much because of Non-Being as because of Being, and because it contains them both, and, in containing them both, constitutes their unity.

Thus this passivity and this silent and subordinate work of Negation are not reasonable. They have no more reason and are no more founded on reason than Negation itself as Trendelenburg conceives it, or than that triad which he substitutes for the Hegelian triad, and on which he tries to rear the scaffolding of his Logic.

*Immortality.**

Mr. Editor:

The speculative interest which attaches to the discussion of the purely rational grounds of a belief in immortality is not, it seems to me, shared in any great degree by the practical interests of life; for, apart from the fact that immortality has been brought to light by other than speculative ways for the satisfaction of men's ethical and emotional needs, that sort of immortality, be it said with respect, which the transcendentalist makes probable, is not of a nature to work powerfully upon the imagination either for good or bad. This consideration emboldens me to offer a few strictures upon the reasoning and presuppositions of Mr. Kroeger, and upon your own remarks, Mr. Editor, in the last number* of the Journal.

The "practical proof" which Mr. Kroeger adduces, and which seems to be a very peculiar modification of the Kantian doctrine, amounts apparently to this:—First, that the moral impulse or conscience could not exist unless it were an absolute imperative. Now all impulses considered in themselves are unconditioned, pure impulse, and in that sense absolute; but if it is meant, as seems, that the moral impulse differs in demanding all or nothing, the proof is called for, as we are certainly conscious of degrees of moral inclination: second, "that no individual can attain this complete and abso-

* A continuation of the discussion in the July number of last year.—*Ed.*